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Introduction
War Crimes are crimes committed with group approval. In
this way they are similar to gang crimes, and different from
crimes committed by single individuals in ordinary society. The
main approving and instigating group in Germany during the
Nazi regime was tile SS which was the most important political
organization in Nazi Germany.
SS stands for Schutz-Staffel, which, translated, means "pro-
tective squadron." No totalitarian state can function without an
SS-like organization. It is therefore important for us to know
all we can about the SS, to understand its motivation and how it
worked, what its strength was and what its weaknesses were;
and it is the duty of sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists
to study these facts and to make them generally understood.
The Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes in Nurn-
berg, founded by Justice Robert H. Jackson and continued and
developed further by General Telford Taylor, has provided
many new and challenging opportunities. Among these oppor-
tunities, unique in history, is the opportunity for a scientific
postmortem of the body politic of the defeated enemy. The
material is enormous. Documents abound in the archives, sig-
nificant books in the libraries. Vast numbers of the participants,
active and passive, in the life of this totalitarian state are avail-
able for examination in the prison, the witness house, and on
the streets, railroad trains and farms of Germany.
A number of studies concerning the leading participants,
especially the 22 men who stood trial before the International
Military Tribunal, have already appeared in print, notably the
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books by Kelley and Gilbert. But before the International Uili-
tary Tribunal not only specific individuals were tried, but also
organizations composed of large groups of partly nameless men,
notably the SS. In the subsequent trials before the Nurnberg
Military Tribunals composed entirely of American judges, the
emphasis has shifted even more to the investigation and trial of
members of organizations declared criminal by the International
Tribunal, of which the most important, far-flung, and powerful
was the SS.
In its days of power and activity the Nazi State liked to com-
pare itself with a racing train in motion. While men stood at the
throttle, the engine which drove Nazi Germany was the SS. It
is therefore important to understand the SS and the sociologic
and psychologic forces which created it, held it together, and
made possible its defeat. This is not only of historical and aca-
demic interest. Totalitarianism has not been eliminated as a
threat, external and internal, with the defeat of Nazi Germany.
By understanding the SS in the socio-psychologic setting of
Germany we may be able to draw general conclusions in re-
gard to the dynamics of totalitarian rule anywhere, and in
regard to the socio-psychologic structure of any country under
such rule. fore specifically, it will aid us in the re-education,
the socio-psychologic rehabilitation of defeated and occupied
Germany.
The SS as a Criminal Organization
The SS was found to be a criminal organization by the
International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg. In order to under-
stand the SS it is necessary to realize thoroughly and to under-
stand the meaning of this finding, and not merely to accept the
dictum of the Military Tribunal. This organization was criminal
not only because its members actually committed crimes but also
because the essential mode of its thinking and its group behavior
was that prevalent in criminal organizations. The individual
criminal as well as the criminal organization commits crimes for
the purpose of gaining selfish ends by criminal means. But in
addition the criminal organization also commits crimes for the
purpose of maintaining and enforcing the continued adherence
and group loyalty of its members since it is vital to the criminal
organization to insure against desertion by its members. This
additional purpose becomes increasingly important as the or-
ganization increases in numbers. It is achieved by involving all
members in sufficient criminal activity to cut off their return to
normal society.
In addition, such criminal societies will continuously search
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for and recruit outside accomplices in order to enlarge the circle
of people that will stand together, part-time members as it were,
who are tied to the organization by being allowed to profit from
the society's crimes, without being completely involved. Such
accomplices are chosen particularly among people of political,
civic, social, or other public influence, so-called "front" men,
who are corrupted and made agreeable to the ends of the criminal
organization, but who are pushed into complete or overt partici-
pation only if and when their loyalty is questioned for some
reason or other. This is the basic pattern of all criminal organi-
zations such as the Maffia and Camorra in Italy and the well-
known criminal gangs of outlaws which have cropped up time
and again in the United States but which have been successfully
held down by the constructive forces of society. Germany was
not so fortunate, and a criminal gang actually gained power over
essential phases of government. This gang constituted the SS.
Its nondrafted members were held together by the same sort
of ties that bind together members of criminal gangs. In the SS
as in all criminal organizations there existed that inclined plane
where nobody could stay at the brink for long, but all had to
roll down into more crime, or be killed or eliminated. We under-
stand these ties very well because we have studied them and
legally dissected them, as it were, in many gang trials in the
United States, and we are now continuing the same process in
studying the SS.
We know that in the SS, as in any other criminal organization,
if a mn did anything which put his loyalty to that organization
into a questionable light, he was either liquidated-that means
killed-or he had to undertake a criminal act which would defi-
nitely and irrevocably tie him to that criminal organization. We
say in such a case the man was put "on the spot." Such an act
must include murder, according to the age-old custom of criminal
gangs. In the SS this was specifically called blutkitt (blood ce-
ment). I first learned of the existence of this special German
term from Dr. Wanda von Baeyer, a German psychologist, who
also told me that Hitler himself introduced the idea and the
word blutkitt, which he had discovered in a book about Genghis
Khan in which it was emphasized that the crimes which the
Ihan's hordes committed served as "blood cement" ("blut-
kitt"), holding the organization together. He was supposed to
have read that book as early as his Landsberg Prison days.
The concentration camps were the main places within the con-
fines of Germany where SS members were expected to acquire
blood cement, until they were considered reliable enough to be
sent abroad into the occupied countries where they could then
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be relied upon to perform similar crimes inside and outside the
confines of specific camp areas.
The peculiar process of indoctrination in crime and cruelty
which young men went through in concentration camps after they
had joined the SS constituted the "hardening process," the
"brutalization course" which the SS organization regarded as
essential for transforming its personnel into willing and reliable
tools for its criminal purposes. While many joined willingly, no
doubt others were seduced by a double appeal-one in the form
of a rationalization that this was for the best interests of Ger-
many (actually for the interests of the SS), and the other in
terms of a far more sinister and direct process of seduction, that
of letting the novices taste the satisfactions obtained from re-
lease of repressed destructive primitive and sadistic drives.
The similarity of the SS to the classical criminal organiza-
tions is also expressed in other circumstances. As in all criminal
societies there were "front" men, "inner circle" men, and
"behind the scenes" men. The SS, like a really large-scale
criminal gang, ran, as it were, on several tracks which some-
times were shielded from each other by tunnels. One has to
understand the SS running on at least three tracks beside and
around each other. The men recently on trial were mostly the
"inner circle" men. The "front" men were sometimes not
pushed into actual criminal activity unless they had come under
suspicion of disloyalty in word or deed as in the case of Dr. Karl
Gebhardt, one of those convicted in the medical case, in the mat-
ter of Heydrich's death, or if they had shown an inclination to
dissociate themselves from the group or to sever ties with the SS.
Gebhardt was a* well-known specialist in bone and joint
surgery, Professor of Surgery at the University of Berlin, and
Surgeon-in-Chief of the noted and renowned Hohenlychen Hos-
pital, which had been the official hospital designated for the
treatment of injuries sustained during the Olympic Games in
Berlin in 1936. He held general's rank in the SS.
Gebhardt was in just such a spot, as he himself said on the
stand (p. 4051 of the German transcript). Gebhardt was sus-
pected of having contributed to the death of Heydrich, who was
under his care after his injury, by failing to treat his wound
infection with sulfonamides, and this omission could definitely
be interpreted as an act which would make him politically sus-
pect in SS circles. Gebhardt was then expected, and was ready,
to commit a criminal act which would definitely tie him into
deeper union with the criminal organization, namely the SS.
This act, in his case, was the criminal experiments which he then
carried out on young girls captured from the Polish resistance
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movement, in whom he produced wounds complicated by tissue
destruction which he subsequently infected with gas gangrene
bacilli, and then demonstrated that a number of these victims
died in spite of sulfonamide treatment. Thus he proved that
Heydrich's death was "fate determined" (a favorite SS phrase),
and that he was not guilty of causing Heydrich's death. He
went one step further by involving the entire German medical
profession in "SS blood cement," by presenting his report
before a national medical meeting without objection being
aroused by any of its members.
The same motivation can also be recognized in the progressive
criminal involvement of members of the inner circle. An ex-
ample of this type is that of Viktor Hermann Brack, member of
the Nazi Party and the SS since 1929, who held the rather low
serial number of 901 in the SS. Having been Bouhler's personal
assistant since 1932, lie became in 1934 Bouhlier's Chief of Staff
at the Chancellory Office of the National Socialist Party. In this
capacity he participated in three major crimes: 1) the killing of
"useless eaters," including patients suffering from nervous or
mental diseases in German state hospitals; 2) the experimental,
administrative, and technical preparations for mass steriliza-
tions of unwanted national and racial groups; and 3) the admin-
istrative and technical arrangements for the mass killing of
unwanted national and racial groups, for which he suggested
and introduced the use of camouflaged gas chambers, which be-
came known as "Brack's remedy." This program was to begin
with the extermination of seven to eight million Jews. The
killing of the Jews was to be the preliminary phase to the killing
of 30 million Slavs, in just the same way as the killing of the
insane was the preliminary phase to the killing of the Jews.
The personality and motivations of this man who held the
position of key executive in the main genocidal crime of the
German State are of great interest in connection with our sub-
ject. It was surprising to find that lie was a rather meek and
polite, decidedly unimpressive individual who claimed that he
had been living in mortal fear of Reinhard ("The Hangman")
Heydrich for several years, ever since lie first started having
difficulties with him in 1937. These difficulties arose from the
fact that Brack, in his capacity as Chief of the Chancellory Office,
handled many petitions addressed to Hitler and took particular
pains in investigating petitions appealing for discharge from
concentration camps. Brack's interest in such petitions was
considered inordinate and an interference in their spheres and
policies by Heydrich, Bormann, and Himmnler.
In the following two years this matter came to a head, the
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culminating point being an incident in the course of which Hey-
drich accused Brack of divulging the contents of secret Gestapo
(SD) files to the relatives of a petitioner who was in a con-
centration camp. Himmler and Bormann complained to Bouhlier
about Brack, demanded Brack's removal from office; and Hey-
drich, by whom Brack had felt personally threatened for some
time, openly threatened him with arrest. It was at that point
that Brack was picked by his chief Boulder, also an old SS
member, to take charge of the technical preparations for the
extermination program of the insane which got underway in the
latter part of 1939, and it was Brack who was taken by Bouhler,
Conti, and Brandt to the first demonstration of a group killing
of mental patients in December 1939. His, later, was the duty to
make repeated checks at the various killing centers where he
had to witness these killings in order to report on the efficacy of
the various types of poison gas used. The choice at that time
fell' upon carbon monoxide which was later to be replaced by
"Cyclone B."
Early in 1941, however, Brack once more aroused some dis-.
pleasure in high SS circles by again taking up occasional cases
of political persecutees. In that period he had intervened, not-
ably and unsuccessfully, in the case of a Dr. Ludwig Schlmitt who
had given assistance to various persecuted socialists as well as
to Otto Strasser and his group, and who was at that time im-
prisoned in a concentration camp, and also in the case of a high-
ranking racial persecutee, Professor Otto Warburg the Nobel
Prize winner, who was threatened with dismissal from the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute and whose dismissal Brack prevented.
Furthermore, Brack had been critical of certain aspects of the
"winter catastrophe" in Russia, especially of the fact that the
armed forces had not coped with the problem of adequate care
for the sick and the wounded particularly the sick and wounded
SS men in that campaign. Chiefly because of his activity in
behalf of Schmitt and Warburg, Brack was called to Gestapo
headquarters where Heydrich gave him a stern warning. Again
shortly after that, in 'March 1941, it happened that Himmiler
entrusted him first with working out plans for mass sterilization
of conquered peoples, and subsequently, in September 1941, with
the preparations for the mass extermination of the Jews.
Brack's involvement is of great interest, and I have the im-
pression that Brack himself was quite unaware of this blood-
cement connection in the setting of the conversation in which
Himmler first informed Brack of his plans and of the role he,
Brack, was to play in the extermination of the Jews. Brack told
the story on the stand (pp. 7507 and 7508 of the English tran-
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script). He stated that he had gone to Hinmler to tell him about
the shortcomings of the motor transport problem and how it
affected the care of the sick and the wounded and what catastro-
phes had resulted from the lack of motor vehicles. He continued:
I reported these matters to Himmler but subsequently, I don't know
why, I voiced my criticism about other matters within the SS. Himmler
quietly listened to me but then tried to convince me in his way about the
correctness of what he was doing. He admitted that some things in the
SS were not as he would like them to be, and that some of the men in
the SS did not quite fit into the organization. But, he said, at this
critical point he needed every single one of the old SS members. He
said, essentially, that only if the old comrades would stand by him
faithfully could the SS cleanse itself of these people who did not fit
into it. He could only expect the most heavy tasks to be carried out by
the old SS members. Then he suddenly stopped and told me that Hitler
had sometime ago given him the order for the extermination of the Jews.
He said that the preparations were already in progress, and I think that
he used the expression that for reasons of camouflage one would have
to work as quickly as possible.
Thus a man such as Brack, who was not quite enough of a con-
kormist, somewhat too troublesome and too critical of his organ-
ization than was considered desirable, although there must have
pre-existed an essential willingness on his part, was made into a
fully cooperative tool of the criminal organization by becoming
involved as an active participant in one of his organization's
greatest crimes.
It is characteristic of the peculiar schematized thinking which
was fostered in SS circles that Brack defended himself with
the most peculiar sophistry against having been a member of a
criminal organization. His defense counsel asked Brack whether
on the basis of his personal conferences with Himmler in 1941
and 1942 he could tell that Himmler wanted to use the SS for
the execution of plans which were judged as criminal by the
International Military Tribunal. Brack replied that he could
not arrive at that conclusion because he assumed that "Himmler
was planning these things as chief of the German police in which
capacity, of course, the RSHA (Reich Security Mfain Office) was
subordinate to him. I could not assume that the SS was to be
used for such purposes," (p. 7549 of the German transcript,
p. 7455 of the English transcript). And Brack kept a perfectly
straight face when he said that in his capacity as an SS man he
had never received any criminal orders. He admitted that
Himmler gave criminal orders and that he himself received
criminal orders and requests. He admitted that the acts of
genocide which were instigated and carried out were a crime.
Brack, however, had no realization of the fact that he slid into
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this crirmnal activity in his capacity as a member of the SS and
that the SS was the main source from which this criminal activity
originated, although this criminal activity did not remain re-
stricted to the SS itself.
Large elements of the Wehrmacht were integrated into the
criminal group, frequently under the motivational influence of
attached SS personnel but with the connivance of key personnel
in the army high command, Keitel for instance. The manner in
which army people were drawn into criminal activity was similar
to the way in which this was done with SS personnel. Thus,
individuals were frequently picked for the commission of certain
crimes of which these people themselves had been vocal in dis-
approving. This is vividly shown in the case of Colonel Karl
von Bothmer, a commander of German armed forces in Yugo-
slavia. i the files of the supreme command of the Wehrmacht
we found a letter from this officer, dated August 6, 1941, (Doe.
Nb. NOKW 101i) in which he had protested against an order
for the indiscriminate shooting of arrested Yugoslav civilians
who had not been specifically taken as hostages for specific
crimes, without due process of martial law. Von Bothmer con-
cluded his letter as follows: "Any request to have people shot to
death who were not involved in the matter I cannot fulfill, par-
ticularly since one may assume in most cases that it will not
touch the culprits at all." We do not know exactly what type of
pressure was exerted on this man. But we know that this was
the very same Colonel Karl von Bothmor who later became
notorious as the mass murderer of Nish, Yugoslavia, where he
committed the very same crime of which his letter of August 6,
1941, had so eloquently disapproved. He has since, namely in
February and March of 1947, been tried for the murder of 700
civilians in February 1942, and he has been executed as a war
criminal.
One of the men sentenced to life imprisonment in the Medical
Case, Professor Dr. Gerhard A. H. Rose, vice president of the
Robert Koch Institute in Berlin, was on trial for participation
in a crime of which he had originally disapproved. This crime
consisted of typhus experiments in the Buchenwald concentra-
tion camp, during which 290 people were killed by inoculation
with live typhus virusj arid of similar experiments at the Natz-
weiler concentration camp, where about 50 people were killed in
the same manner. Prior to his own participation Rose had made
a personal protest against these experiments to the president of
the Robert Koch Institute, Professor Gildemeister, who had or-
ganized the experiments; and later, after he had already par-
ticipated, he again expressed himself as opposed to these ex-
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periments on scientific and moral grounds, in an open meeting
of the third conference of consulting physicians in May 1943 in
Berlin, at which Dr. Ding-Schuler, who carried out the Buchen-
wald experiments, presented his first scientific results. Never-
theless, Rose soon resumed his participation.
It is obvious that group pressure, although no overt threats
or coercion, was brought to bear on von Bothmer, on Rose, and
on the others who committed crimes in violation of their own
principles. This illustrates that an important fact concerning
motivation and with which we are so familiar in ordinary crime
applies also to war crimes and to these ideologically conditioned
crimes against humanity-namely, that fear and cowardice, espe-
cially fear of ostracism by the group, are in a number of cases
more important motives than simple ferocity or aggressiveness.
Another example is that of Otto Ohlendorf, Gruppenfuehrer
(lieutenant general) of the Waff en SS, whose ghastly testimony
before the International Military Tribunal in Nurnberg will be
remembered by all who know the record of the case. He was
the chief of the dreaded Einsatzgruppe D, one of the four special
task forces which operated in the conquered eastern territories.
His testimony of January 3, 1946, covers pages 2001 to 2055 of
the transcript. Ohlendorf admitted on the stand responsibility
for the killing of 90,000 unarmed men, women, and children (p.
2010 of the record). He admitted that he was present at these
mass executions. The question by a member of the tribunal,
"Were all Jewish children murdered?", was answered by Ohlen-
dorf with "Yes," (p. 2037 of the record).
Ohlendorf carried out his ghastly work in the East from July
1941 till June 1942. Prior to this assignment he held a position
under the Economics Ministry and at the same time acted as
part-time chief of Office III of the RSHA (SD) of the SS.
Upon meeting this confessed mass murderer I was rather sur-
prised to find him to be a mild-mannered man of slight.build and
of a deliberate, hesitant, even diffident, manner of speech. He
stated that he had been a loyal Party member and a member of
the SS since 1925. His first difficulties with the Party hierarchy
occurred in 1933 after the rise to power of National Socialism
because he had opposed a trend toward what he called "National
Bolshevism" within the Party. He was imprisoned for a short
time in Kiel but was soon released and promoted. He again had
serious difficulties with Himmler in 1939 because of his dis-
agreement with Himmler's anti-Jewish policy. He had sub-
mitted a plan to give the Jews a minority status shortly after the
beginning of the Polish campaign, in October 1939, which was
violently disapproved of by Heydrich and Himmler. At that
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time Himmler demanded Ohlendorf's dismissal from the gov-
ernment service and from the SS, but Heydrich smoothed things
out because he preferred to have subordinates who were not on
too good terms with Himmiler and whose contacts with Himmler
would therefore have to go through him alone.
Ohlendorf again got into difficulties in 1941 when he attempted
to protect the adherents of the anthroposophic movement1 who
were then beginning to be persecuted by the Nazi government.
It was shortly after that that he received his orders to head one
of the dreaded "Einsatzgruppen" (special task forces) in the
East. These Einsatzgruppen consisted of 500 enlisted men, 150
officers, and one commanding officer. Their sole purpose was to
kill large groups of unarmed, defenseless men, women, and
children who had been registered and collected for the ostensible
purpose of being re-settled in another locality. In reality they
were transported in trucks to lonely places in the country where
they were murdered. Ohlendorf was slated to be the command-
ing officer of one of these Einsatzgruppen. He stated that he
had refused this assignment twice but had accepted when he was
ordered the third time. I asked him why he had refused. He
replied that he had no inclination for this task, saying,
I never have been friendly toward the State police and I never wanted
to have anything to do with this matter, but I was ordered by Heydrich
because-I must express it the way I know it-for one thing, he wanted
to have me removed from Berlin because Bormann demanded it. I had
come into disrepute as a protector of the anthroposophers. I had first
supported them in opposition to policy in May, 1941 after they had
been forbidden and locked up by Bormann. And furthermore, Heydrich
wanted to take away my liberty which consisted of the fact that I was
not financially dependent upon the SS but that my official assignment
was under the Economics Ministry. These two motives were the reasons
he wanted to get me away from Berlin; and that he gave me this assign-
ment was probably caused by the fact that he wanted to demoralize me
because already then and later I was against his SD2 activity . . .And
that not only came from Heydrich but especially from Himmler."
Ohlendorf then continued that he had refused the assignment
at first because the manner of killing these people was disagree-
able to him. "What manner?" I asked.
He replied, "The shooting of defenseless human beings." I
then asked him: "When did you know for the first time that this
was not merely a disagreeable assignment, but that it was a
crime ? When were you for the first time conscious of that fact ?"
1 The adherents of an esoteric sect similar to one known in the United Stlates
as the theosophic movement.
2 SD, or Sicherheits-Dienst (Security Service), is the SS equivalent of the Gastapo,
which in view of the fact that Himmler, the chief of the SS, was at the same time




He replied, "When I first heard that these things happened."
"When was that?"
"That I cannot exactly say; but whether I already had heard
of it before I received the order or afterwards, that I can no
longer say. At any rate this order was a subject which was dif-
ficult to take from the human standpoint."
I then asked Ohlendorf what he meant by the term, "to de-
moralize me." Did he mean that because he had shown some op-
position in the question of treatment of the Jews and the anthro-
posophers, he was subsequently deliberately put into a position
where he not only had to accept decisions which went against
his grain but where he himself actually had to act against his
own convictions? Ohlendorf replied that this was the general
policy in dealing with such people who, like himself, dared to dis-
agree, in order "to corrupt us morally" (urn uns moralisch
kaputt zu machen).
Ohlendorf went on to say that in this system of controlling
people by corrupting them morally various methods were used.
He stated that he did not know for sure to what extent Hitler
used this technique, but Himrnler and Heydrich always tried to
corrupt people whom they wanted to use in order to have them
completely in hand. This was not always done by involving them
in capital crimes; in some cases lesser, compromising situations
sufficed. Heydrich established a special brothel in Berlin for that
purpose. He would invite people there, put them into a com-
promising situation-in some cases by using a quite primitive
system of seduction-and then suddenly Heydrich appeared on
the scene and it was made clear to the person involved that Hey-
drich had been a spectator. Heydrich used this special brothel
as a means of blackmail. An SS general who had a mentally ill
brother was occasionally reminded of that fact as a means of
blackmail by a no lesser personage than Himmler himself. Other
people were bribed, such as the field marshals, or were involved
in financial corruption as were many people in the Speer min-
istry. The Speer ministry was just one hotbed of corruption-
everybody was doubly paid and more than that. Other people
who could not be bribed by Hitler, Himmler, and Speer or com-
promised by means of seduction to sex escapades by Heydrich
were involved in more sinister ways. All knowledge of a man's
weak points was used against him.
Ohlendorf continued,
Since I was in disrepute as an unsoldierly type who had previously
declined to become a soldier, they hoped in this way to influence my
character, which they knew was predominantly sensitive, in order to
make me transgress and thus to force me into their pattern.
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The type of blood cement outlined above played a role even in
the case of Dr. Sigmund Rascher, the notorious vivisectionist of
Dachau concentration camp. Prior to making application to
Himmler and the SS to permit him to make experiments on in-
mates of Dachau concentration camp in May 1939, he had been
forbidden to use the facilities of the Pathological Institute of
the University of Munich because he was suspected of having
communist sympathies (Doe. No. NO-3679).
A very important case in this connection is that of Erich von
dem Bach-Zelewski, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the
Waffen SS and police. Von dem Bach was in charge of all so-
called antipartisan activities in the eastern territories. He
commanded troops which roamed all over the vast conquered
eastern territories behind the German fighting fronts in Roland
and Russia, whose record of looting, arson, and mass murder is
equalled only by that of the Huns and Mongols of days past.
General von dem Bach was the deputy Genghis Khan of this
horde which was composed of SS and police troops and attached
Wehrmacht formations. The number of these troops was greater
than that of the Einsatz groups. Von dem Bach had up to two
divisions at his disposal, although the number of troops which
were assigned to him varied during various phases of the war.
The troops which he commanded included the notorious
Dirlewanger Brigade which was composed of habitual criminals
including poachers, robbers, murderers, men condemned because
of sex crimes, and those political prisoners who had been mem-
bers of the Nazi Party prior to the commission of their political
offens6. Its commanding officer, Oskar Dirlewanger, had l]imself
been in prison for sex crimes. The number of people who were
murdered in cold blood by Von dem Bach's forces is likewise
much greater than the victims of any one Einsatz group. While
Ohlendorf, head of Einsatz Group D, admitted the killing of
90,000 men, women and children in the space of one year, merely
one single report of antipartisan activities (Report No. 51, of 29
December 1942 applying to the months of August to November
1942) shows that among others 363,211 Jews were executed by
these formations.
The exact records of infamy which these culprits kept is a
novel feature in crime, which is quite characteristic of the SS as
a whole, with only a few cagey exceptions. It is obviously the
result of indoctrination. Non-SS Nazis, when involved in sim-
ilar crimes, usually tried to cover up at the same time.
The case of Von dem Bach is interesting because he not only
admitted the fact that crimes were committed but he also showed
a certain amount of insight into how they came about. All the
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while he was of course trying to minimize his personal participa-
tion and responsibility, more so than Ohlendorf. But he showed
greater insight in regard to the fact that the Nazi ideology and
the basic structure of Nazism and the SS were the cause of these
crimes, while Ohlendorf and others held not National Socialism
itself responsible for these crimes but rather what they called
the "dark side" of Hitler's and Himmler's personalities.
Von dem Bach testified before the International Military
Tribunal on January 7, 1946 (pp. 2219-2244 of the record). He
stated that he enlisted in the German army in 1914 at the age of
15 years, that he served from 1914 to 1918 and was wounded and
decorated twice. He remained as an officer in the peacetime army
after the last war, was discharged in 1924, and then transferred
as battalion commander to an unofficial border defense formation
but continued to remain a reserve officer in the army. He joined
the Nazi Party and the SS in 1930, and in 1932 he was elected as
a National Socialist representative of the German Reichstag. In
1934 he became superior SS and police leader for East Prussia
and in 1936 for Silesia. At the beginning of the war against
Russia he was sent to the Russian front with the rank of Grup-
penfuehrer and lieutenant general of the Waff en SS and police.
He saw front-line service before Moscow and near Veliky Luky.
He was subsequently.appointed as higher SS and police leader
for the rear zone of the central army group under General Von
Schenkendorff with the principal assignment of fighting par-
tisans in the rear of the German central army group. Forma-
tions Qf the Waffen SS, of the border police, and of the Wehr-
macht were put at his disposal for these activities. At the end
of 1942 he was appointed chief of all antipartisan units for the
entire eastern territories, in which capacity he was subordinate
only to Heinrich Himmler.
Von dem Bach admitted that these antipartisan operations
were carried out in such a way as to result in the unnecessary
killing of large numbers of the civilian population (p. 2225 of
the record). He claimed that he and General Von Schenkendorff
were powerless to stop these excesses because of an order issued
by the highest Wehrmacht authorities that German soldiers who
committed offenses against the civilian population were not to
be punished. "This order was an obstacle to correcting the ex-
cesses of the troops," and "prevented the only proper way of
fighting" (p. 2225 of the record). Von dem Bach was then asked,
"Do you know anything abodt the existence of a special brigade
which was formed from contrabandists, poachers, and people
released from prison ?" He replied:
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One battalion under the command of Dirlewanger was put in as an
antipartisan unit in the central army group. This battalion was grad-
ually enlarged by some reserves, actually reaching the size of a regiment
and later of a brigade. This was the Brigade Dirlewanger, and it con-
sisted for the most part of criminal elements, officially of poachers, but
there were real criminals among them who had committed robbery and
even murder.
He was then asked why the German army used forces recruited
from the ranks of criminals especially in the war against the
partisans. He replied:
I am of the opinion that there was a close connection with the speech
made by Heinrich Himmler at the beginning of 1941 before the cam-
paign against Russia, when he spoke of the purpose of the Russian
campaign, which was to decimate the Slav population by 30 million, and
in order to be active in this direction, a troop of low characters would
have to be formed, (p. 2228 of the record).
Von deni Bach then admitted that the type of troops used
and the instructions given were aimed at the direct destruction
of the population. He stated that official reports had to be made
as to how many partisans had been killed in battle, how many
partisans had been executed, how many people suspected to be
partisans had been executed, and how many losses the troops
themselves had sustained; from these reports the highest author-
ities could see exactly what went on.
Individual commanders were empowered to decide for them-
selves whom they wanted to suspect as a partisan and to ldll
him (p. 2230 of the record). Von dem Bach admitted that the
fighting against partisan movements was designed for the de-
struction of the Slav and Jewish people in the eastern conquered
territories. He stated that the Wehrmacht was aware of this
aim that the methods of antipartisan warfare were designed
for the destruction of the Slavic and Jewish races-that is, for
the complete destruction of the Jewish race and the reduction
of the Slav race by 30 millions (p. 2231 of the record). Upon
repeated questioning, he reiterated that the Slav population was
to be reduced by 30 millions. He stated that Hiimler had men-
tioned this in his speech-prior to the Russian campaign.
Von dem Bach claimed that he had made many proposals to
change this policy and to limit the use of antipartisan forces
strictly to real antipartisan activity; but he petitioned unsuc-
cessfully because, as he found out, su*ch a change was not desired
by Himmler (p. 2232 of the record). At Himmler's Wewelsburg
speech in 1941 twelve of the leading Gruppenfuehrers of the SS,
including Von dem Bach. had been present. In the cross-exami-
nation by Rosenberg's defense counsel, Dr. Thoma, Von dem
Bach again confirmed the fact that many innocent people were
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killed in the so-called antipartisan activities. He was then asked
by the defense counsel (p. 2241 of the record): "How did you
reconcile it with your conscience to be an inspector general and
to remain an inspector general with the antipartisan forces?"
A. I did not reconcile that with my conscience.
Q. Do you believe that Himmler's order in which he demanded that
30 million Slavs should be exterminated--do you believe that was his
opinion or was it a part of the whole National Socialistic attitude toward
life ?
A. I am today of the mind that the logical consequences of that atti-
tude was such an order.
Q. Today-what was your opinion at that time?
A. It is difficult for a German to make this confession and it took me
a long while.
Q. How does it happen that a few days ago a witness appeared before
this tribunal, namely Ohlendorf, who admitted that under his command
of Einsatz groups, 90,000 people were killed, and informed the court that
this did not correspond to National Socialist ideology?
A. I am of the opinion that when for years, for decades, the doctrine
is preached that the Slav race is an inferior race and Jews not even
human, then such an outcome is inevitable.
Q. Nevertheless, the fact remains, along with the attitude that you
may have had at that time, you also had a conscience?
A. Today also, and that is the reason I am here.
In a preceding interrogation which took place on October 19,
1945, Von dem Bach had stated that he was relieved from his
position in Silesia and sent to the Russian front because he had
refused to put the Jews in his area into ghetto camps and, espe-
cially, to arrange pogroms in which 5,000 were supposed to be
shot. In other interrogations Von dem Bach had made the same
and similar statements and had also made the statement that
as early as 1935 he had difficulties withoHimmler. At one time
in 1935 he had been arrested by order of Goering and Himmler
and was supposed to be executed, but his life was then saved by
the intervention of Darre. I therefore decided to re-interrogate
Von dem Bach and to obtain some more data about the socio-
psychological setting in which he had committed his crimes.
I found Von dem Bach to be a well-built man of athletic
physique who gave the impression of a man of hard-driving
energy and of a great deal of ambition. He spoke with clarity
and vigor. He showed definite eagerness to make a good impres-
sion and to minimize his own participation, and yet it appeared
that he had given a good deal of thought to what he and others
about him had done during the last 13 years. All leading ques-
tions were avoided and he was allowed to express himself and to
state his case quite freely. It is interesting that in this connec-
tion he formulated, without the slightest suggestion on my part,
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a very clear conception of the blood cement theory outlined
above. His statements of facts were later checked with others,
especially Ohlendorf and Wolff.
As to his arrest and threatened execution in 1935, he stated
that he had, in his capacity as superior SS leader for East
Prussia, objected to the corrupt financial practices of the
Gauleiter Koch; and for this reason during a speech which
Finance Minister Schacht gave in Koenigsberg in which he
endorsed Koch's policies, Von dem Bach demonstratively
walked out of the hall and took his entire SS detachment with
him. (Karl Wolff, Himmler's former chief of staff, confirmed
this incident: He recalled that Schacht had said in his speech
that honor, blood, and flag were all right, but gold also was a
reality to be reckoned with. Wolff stated that he approved of
Von dem Bach's courage and determination to march out with
the eutire SS at this point. He added that Von dem Bach missed
being executed by a hair's breadth because of Goering's and
Himmler's resentment of this action.)
After his rehabilitation on Darre's intervention, Von dem
Bach was not sent back to East Prussia but was given an equiv-
alent assignment in Silesia to which certain provinces taken
from Poland were later added. In 1940 he again incurred Himm-
ler's displeasure by not cooperating in the establishment of
ghetto camps for Jews and later by his failure to arrange
pogroms in his territory.
About his subsequent activities in Russia and in the parts of
Poland taken from Russia after the beginning of the Russian
campaign, he of course tried to incriminate himself as little as
possible, as he had done on previous interrogations. In an inter-
rogation on January 15, 1947, when he was shown the above-
cited report on the execution of 366,211 Jews by antipartisan
forces during August to November 1942, he merely stated that
this was the sort of camouflage which he had always disapproved
of because execution of Jews is certainly not antipartisan war-
fare. These mass executions were usually carried out in lonely
places in the country before deep gullies or large anti-tank
ditches into which the bodies fell or were dumped and covered
with dirt.
It is obvious, however, from the documentary evidence that
Von dem Bach himself included such and similar executions in
his reports on antipartisan warfare, for instance in his report
dated Minsk, 23 June 1943 (Doe. No. NO-2608) in which the
ratio of casualties (600 on the German side versus 10,000 parti-
sans) and the small number of weapons captured (900 rifles)
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indicated that the majority of partisans listed as "killed in
action" in the report were actually rounded up and massacred.
(Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff stated that Von dem Bach was
always intent on giving large figures because be wanted to get
the Knight's Cross very badly and that one time he had criti-
cized him because in a report covering May and June 1944, Von
dem Bach had taken credit for people, by including them in his
own report, who had actually been killed by SS Gruppenfuehrer
(Lieutenant General) Globocnik's outfit in the southeastern
theatre of war in northern Italy and Yugoslavia when Von
dem Bach inspected Globocnik's operations in that theatre dur-
ing May and June 1944.)
Von dem Bach expressed great pride over the fact that he had
once preferred court martial charges against some of his men
who killed a group of four or five civilian suspects in a particu-
larly cruel manner by pouring gasoline over them and setting
them on fire while they were still alive; this was done in the
courtyard of a building amidst shouts of approval from a great
crowd of soldiers. The court martial sentences which included
death and prison sentences were, however, disapproved by
higher authority and the culprits were freed (Interrogation No.
633 of 17 January 1947). In a similar incident when the entire
male population of a village was executed and fire was set to
the village after the women, children, and cattle had been driven
away, he decided after consultation with higher authority not
to prefer charges against the perpetrators under his command
because a conviction was considered unlikely (Interrogation No.
633A of 20 January 1947). There is, however, documentary evi-
dence to prove that Von dem Bach by no means condemned such
outrages prior to German's defeat, but on the contrary recom-
mended to higher authority the court martial of one of his sub-
ordinate SS Sturmbannfuehrers who had made an official com-
plaint about such atrocities in 1944 (Doc. No. NO-2530).
Von dem Bach told me and previous interrogators that on
three occasions in 1941 he had warned the Jews of Bialystok,
Mogilev, and Baranowicze respectively of the fact that his
forces were approaching and of what was in store for them, by
sending word ahead to the chief rabbi of each of these three
towns. His motive for doing this was that one of his sisters who
had emigrated to Brazil was married to a Jewish musician who
had been born in Bialystok and whose relatives still lived there.
He knew this brother-in-law well and had been rather fond of
him before this brother-in-law and his sister were forced to
emigrate from Germany after the Nazis came to power. For
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that reason he sent the warning. He stated, however, that his
warning was not taken seriously enough. After hiding a few
days and when they thought "that the German civilian admin-
istration was there," the Jews returned from the woods and
walked in to their own destruction. (Obviously these rabbis and
their country flocks did not understand the complexity and the
characteristic "dual-track thinking" of this high-ranking SS
man who had seemed to be friendly by warning them; on the
other hand, it is much more likely that they returned because
they ran out of food in the woods).
"Thus the misfortune came about. They did not believe . . . I am the
only living witness but I must say the truth. Contrary to the opinion
of the National Socialists that the Jews were a highly organized group,
the appalling fact was that they had no organization whatsoever. The
mass of the Jewish people were completely taken by surprise. They did
not know at all what to do; they had no directives or slogan as to how
they should act. That is the greatest proof of the lie of anti-Semitism
because it gives the lie to the old slogan that the Jews are conspiring
to dominate the world and that they are so highly organized. In reality
they had no organization of their own at all, not even an information
service. If they had some sort of organization, these people could have
been saved by the millions; but instead they were taken completely by
surprise. Never before has a people gone as unsuspectingly to its dis-
aster. Nothing was prepared. Absolutely nothing. It is not so, as the
anti-Semites say, that they were friendly to the Soviets. That is the
most appalling misconception of all. The Jews in the old Poland, who
were never communistic in their sympathies, were, throughout the area
from the river Bug eastward, more afraid of Bolshevism than of the
Nazis. This was insanity. They could have been saved. There were
people among them who had much to lose, business people; they didn't
want to leave. In addition there was the love of home and their old
experiences with the pogroms in Russia. After the first anti-Jewish
actions of the Germans they thought now the wave was over and so they
walked back to their undoing."
In August 1944 Von dem Bach was put in charge of the sup-
pression of the Warsaw revolt which was led on the Polish side
by General Bor-Komorowski. This military action, with its
resulting sacking and razing of Warsaw and the wanton murder
of a large part of its civilian population, is one of the worst
crimes committed by the German armed forces. Von dem Bach
admitted that even before the defeat of Germany he had disap-
proved of the conduct of that operation. He stated that he was
given the singular honor of having a medal struck in commemo-
ration of this action and to be in sole charge of its award to
meritorious participants in this operation; but because of the
type of operation it had been he never made use of this privilege
and did not award this medal to anyone. However, he admitted
that he himself received the coveted Knight's Cross after the
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successful suppression of the Warsaw revolt. He credits himself
with two acts of chivalry-one, that he court martialed one of
his subordinate SS Gruppenfuehrers, Kaminski, and had him
executed unofficially because of his excesses in looting, without
waiting for approval by higher authorities; and secondly, for
the fact that he took his military opponents as prisoners of war
contrary to Hitler's and Himniler's orders-according to which
they should all have been killed by execution upon capture. Con-
trary to these orders he brought the revolt to an end by giving
General Bor-Komiorowski and the remainder of his forces the
status of prisoners of war as terms for their surrender. For this
purpose he had to countermand Hitler's and Himmler's order
which explicitly stated, "Everyone is to be killed. No prisoners
are to be taken. Warsaw is to be razed to the ground and an
example is to be made for all of Europe." He stated that he
incurred both Hitler's and Himmler's wrath by disregarding
that order and for taking General Bor-Komorowski and the re-
mainder of his forces prisoners on 28 September 1944. He was
ordered to report personally to Hitler's headquarters and to
explain his action.
The way in which Hitler handled the situation was very char-
acteristic of our theory outlined above and entirely in conformity
with it. He immediately gave Von dem Bach a new and still more
criminal assignment as plenipotentiary to carry out the coup
d'etat in Hungary. In the course of this coup d'etat on October
14, 1944, the regent of that country was imprisoned, his son kid-
napped, the entire country taken under German control, and
60,000 Jews were arrested immediately for purposes of exter-
mination and deportation, of which 25,000 were killed outright
or perished on the subsequent eight-day death march which
began on October 15, 1944. Von dem Bach described this interest-
ing interview with Hitler, which took place early in October,
1944, immediately prior to his assignment to Hungary, as
follows:
"Hitler told me, 'Actually you have forfeited your head because you
have acted against my orders. But since your method has been successful
and the battle is won after all, I have accepted it.' That was typically
Hitler. But I still felt uneasy because I could name innumerable exam-
ples of people to whom he gave a decoration and then had them hanged.
He continued: 'The success was decisive. I have approved of it now.
You were lucky. Maybe you will be lucky again the next time too. You
seem to have a streak of luck now.' Everybody was there, Keitel, Himm-
ler, Goering, all prominent people. I said, 'I have held out and been
successful only because I kept up negotiations with the partisans.' Hitler
then said, 'Hungary threatens to secede. I shall send you now to Hun-
gary to prevent the secession of Hungary and I will give you plenipoten-
tiary power. You have to prevent Horthy from jumping off the running
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train, if need be by armed force. The moment of action I will determine
myself. I shall send you word by courier. You will have to arrest the
entire Hungarian government and to take care that the Hungarians will
not fight against Germany as the Roumanians did.' "
Himmler's reaction on the same occasion was in the form of a
bit of not too subtle blackmail. He congratulated Von dem Bach
on his victory over Warsaw and at the same time gave him a
notarized certificate that his brother Viktor Von dem Bach had
died insane in a sanitarium near Bielefeld. This was obvious
blackmail because of what it meant to an SS officer to be "heredi-
tarily tainted" in any form.
In Hungary, after Regent Horthy's son was kidnapped by
Von dem Bach's subordinate, SS Lieutenant Colonel Skorzeny,
Von dem Bach received word from Hitler to take over as pleni-
potentiary, to deliver an ultimatum to Horthy, and to bring
about his capitulation on October 14, 1944. Von dem Bach was
still rather proud of the trick which he played on Horthy by
bluffing him with a large number of heavy tanks for which no
ammunition had yet arrived. As soon as Von dem Bach took
over the control of Hungary, on October 14, 1944, Heinrich
Hinunler immediately telephoned him long distance, offered his
congratulations, and urged him not to delay and make difficulties
with the immediate deportation and extermination of the Jews
of Budapest. There is no doubt that these measures were carried
out immediately, namely on October 15, 1944, but Von dem Bach
went through a great deal of explanations that this was actually
Winkelmann's and Veesenmeyer's responsibility. Although Von
dem Bach was the plenipotentiary he insisted that Veesenmeyer
could have prevented the action against the Jews but that he
would have been dismissed from office had he done so (Interro-
gation Summary No. 1875 of 14 April 1947).
Von dem Bach revealed the first evidence of real insight into
the social-psychological role which involvement in crime played
in Nazi Germany in a rather surprising connection when he dis-
cussed the fact that the Allied countries had not utilized with
sufficient determination the antagonisms which existed in pre-
war Germany between the army on the one hand and the SS and
Party on the other. He said:
"There were opposition groups in existence. Think of the enormous
animosity which existed between army and Party. Then, compelled by
the war and by their bad conscience they were brought together. Hitler
let them all become guilty. I am firmly convinced that his great crimes
had only that one motive: 'I will let them all become guilty. They must
never be allowed to jump off the running train.' If one sees it that way,
you see how one becomes guilty, if you take Field Marshal von Weichs
for instance as an example. This man, who throughout the entire army
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not only in Hitler's time but even before was called 'the pious general,'
this man, who as a devout Catholic never missed a religious service, who
still in this war in Belgrade had his own private chaplain who held
masses especially for him-this man will be tried here and it will be
proven that he is guilty, that he has really backed up pure terror orders
which were entirely inhuman, the hostage orders, that he in any case
passed them on."
I then asked General Von dem Bach, "Did you hear in this
connection the word 'blood cement'?" He answered:
That is quite clear. That is the same as what I mean.
Q. Did you hear that expression?
A. I don't recall that expression. Is that supposed to be a Hitler
expression?
Q. Yes. Hitler was supposed to have obtained that from a book on
Genghis Khan.
A. I received this book. I can testify that it was officially sent out
by Hermann Goering with Himmler's approval. At Christmas in 1938
it was sent to everyone in the Party down to county leader (Kreisleiter).
There were two volumes and a supplement. Therefore I became con-
vinced that one wanted to solve this question of the excess birthrate in
the East, which was bound to crush Germany some day, in this war
once and for all in the manner of a Genghis Khan. I therefore was not
surprised when already during the war against Poland ghettos were
established, but the main danger I found in the East was the annihila-
tion of the Slavs.
He went on to say that in 1943 preparations for the systematic
mass extermination of the Slavs were made in the neighborhood
of Smolensk, near Mogilev. In this region which was under the
control of Von dem Bach, the erection of large gas chambers
and crematoria was planned by a commission which arrived
from Hamburg, Germany, and looked over various sites includ-
ing an armament factory which was to be transformed into an
extermination center which would dwarf the gas chambers and
crematoria at Auschwitz. After the complete occupation of
Russia the "problem of the Slavs" was to be solved by large-
scale exterminations. The enforced retreat of the German army,
however, foiled this plan.
Von dem Bach stated that in the system of letting people
become guilty in order to control them with which the Nazis
operated, presents of money and the encouragement of financial
corruption were also used. He said:
General Brauchitsch let Hitler pay for his second wife. Hitler paid
the settlement to Brauchitsch's first wife and in that way Brauchitsch
became Hitler's bound serf. If I accept 100,000 marks I am no longer
a free man. Guderian allowed Himmler, on Hitler's order, to give him
a baronial estate in Posen. The old Field Marshal Hindenburg allowed
Hitler to give him the Prussian Forest in East Prussia as a present.
Mackensen let Hitler give him an estate near Stettin which once belonged
to his ancestors. I saw already in these early days how Hitler bought
these people. All these people thus became accomplices.
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The talk which I had with Karl Wolff, SS Obergruppenfuehrer
and general of the Waffen SS, who had been chief of Himmler's
personal staff from 1933 until 1943, was likewise very revealing.
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff was expected to be thoroughly fa-
miliar with all personnel problems concerning Himmiler's staff
until September, 1943, when he was transferred as supreme SS
and police leader to the Italian theatre of war where he was
taken prisoner of war by the Allies after Germany's defeat.
Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff is a tall slender man of good ap-
pearance and manners, who is exteriorly smart, suave, and
smooth. He is somewhat overpolite, indicating a marked eager-
ness to please and to make a good impression. He is the type of
man whom the Germans call Streber, by which they mean an
effectively ambitious person, a place hunter.
Wolff was very much on the defensive about his personal par-
ticipation in crimes. He claimed that as chief of Himmler's
protocol he was merely in charge of the social, the cultural, the
beautiful, and the positive aspects of Himmler's activities;
while for all matters which had to do with what he called Himm-
ler's "second face," Heydrich exclusively was in charge. I did
not want to disturb the interview by pointing out the fact that
on a captured film record of one of Himmler's visits to a death
camp in Mlinsk in 1941 the striking figure of Obergruppenfuehrer
Wolff can be seen walking immediately behind and to the right
of Himmler amid the scenes of horror, walking along the.barbed-
wire enclosure in which huddled masses of emaciated humanity
look on in mute fear and despair while the hangmen strut by.
This film which shows the visit of Himmler and his staff to the
extermination camp in Minsk in 1941 is included in the docu-
mentary film "The Nazi Rise to Power" which is a document
of the International Military Tribunal (Doe. No. USA 167).
Subsequent conversation likewise brought out the fact that
Wolff knew far more about Himmler's activities than he was
willing to admit under direct questioning. He said that the be-
ginning of the development of what he called the "second face"
of Himmler was his deification of power and success which caused
him to become unfaithful to the decent goals of the SS. By his
infidelity he involved others in that same infidelity to the old,
decent SS ideals:
This unfaithfulness began at the top. He wanted to have success at any
price. He thought that "Right is what is useful to my nation." This
concept has not grown up gradually as it had in England where it was
balanced by a careful weighing of the price, but with him became
boundless without weight and measure of the cost. It became the en-
forcement of policy at any price. In carrying out the task set by the
Fuehrer to render the eastern territories free of all contamination by
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non-Germans he used a small circle of people as principal aides. Himm-
ler rendered those people whom he intended to use powerless to resist
his commands by implied and open threats, including the threat of hold-
ing their families responsible if they did not cooperate (Sippenhaft).
All this recruitment and these pressures went on behind closed doors.
At the time the decision was made to carry out the planned extermina-
tions, principally the extermination of the Jews, the matter had already
been prepared by a few collaborators, especially Eichmann and Hoess.
They were already there when the decision came to exterminate. When
that decision had ripened in Himmler's brain one day he also decided to
entrust the execution of the plan to a small group of close associates
which he picked himself. Globocnik 3 appeared the most suitable for
such a brutal task. He was always considered a ruthless person. Also,
Von dem Bach was somewhat similar. Others were of a different type of
mentality and were chosen for other reasons. Ohlendorf was always an
especially decent fellow. He was an idealist who, as Reichfuehrer
Himmler used to say, "always ran about lamenting and deploring, and
acted as if he were the only one who carried the Grail in his hands
unsullied." Ohlendorf was rather soft by nature, to which the Reichs-
fuehrer objected and which he wanted to see changed by education. He
had a blameless past without dark points so that he could not be put
under pressure. The Reichsfuehrer wanted to harden this valuable man.
I then asked Wolff to tell me more about Globocnik. He replied
that Globoenik was an old Nazi Party member from Austria who
had been imprisoned there in Woellersdorf prior to the Anschluss
because of his Nazi Party membership. After the conquest of
Austria, he was made Gauleiter of Vienna with the rank of
colonel in the SS. However, he failed in this position because of
his difficulty in getting along with other old Party members
there. He was subsequently deprived of his rank and reduced
to a simple enlisted SS man. He served in the Polish campaign
as an enlisted man and later became a sergeant, finally being
promoted to second lieutenant. Then suddenly, after the exter-
mination program had been decided upon, he was put in charge
of the exterminations of Jews by gas and for that purpose was
made superior SS and police leader of Lublin with the rank of
Major General of Police, which was quite a jump in rank; this
was done because after all he was an old fighter. He had been
imprisoned in Woellersdorf and the view was taken that he had
been overthrown by intrigues and so Himmler wanted to give
him a chance to rehabilitate himself by this assignment to Lublin.
In October, 1943, Globocnik was transferred and promoted to
the rank of SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant General of
Police, in which capacity he was placed in charge of five northern-
Italian and Yugoslav provinces, obviously in recognition of his
3 SS Grppenfuehrer Odilo Globocnik was the man in charge of the extermination
center in Lublin, Poland, where the first mass executions of Jews by means of gas
were carried out in specially built gas chambers.
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participation in the organization of the extermination program
of the Jews in gas chambers, which he instituted in Poland with
the advice and expert guidance of Brack who had placed experi-
ence and personnel from the extermination program of the insane
at his disposal for the genocidal program in the East. According
to a report received on 2 June 1945, Globocnik committed suicide
by poison after his arrest by Allied forces.
I then asked Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff what would have hap-
pened if Ohlendorf, for ihstance, had refused to carry out his
assignment. Wolff replied:
He would have been silenced. He (Himmler) would not have let him
live. He would have liquidated him in some illegal way. Himmler
would have done so from his conviction that someone must do it if it
is necessary for the welfare of 85 million Germans. Then one must
sacrifice the salvation of one's soul, or one must give up one's life.
Wolff added that the view which an SS member had to take in this
matter was like this: "I must do it. In order to clear this new living
space I must sacrifice myself, the salvation of my soul, and my honor,
or else give up my life."
The fact that the blood-cement theory was applied on a much
larger scale than merely in individual cases is nowhere more
clearly expressed than in Gottlob Berger's reaction to reports
on SS crimes, particularly crimes committed by Von dem Bach
and Von Gottberg and their units in Russia, which he received
in July 1943. It is interesting to realize at this point that the
German army at times prepared extensive reports on atrocities
committed by the SS in various theatres of war. Usually the SS
countered this by compiling a still larger number of reports on
atrocities committed by the army in the same theatre of war,
according to Kogon.4 Kogon states in his book that this went so
far that once the army compiled an entire volume containing
evidence on atrocities committed by the SS. The SS parried this
move by compiling two volumes of evidence on atrocities com-
mitted by the army in the same theatres of war.
It is very interesting and revealing to go through some of
these original reports. One of the earliest is a transcript of an
oral report by an army commander to Lieutenant General von
Bomhard and General of the Police Daluege on 6 February 1940
(Doe. No. NO-3011). In this report the German commander ex-
pressed the opinion that the official policy of persecution of Jews
and Poles, acts of violence against the Jews, and in the first
place the atrocities committed by SS and police personnel were
doing great harm to the German cause.
The report went on:
4 Kogon, Eugen. Der SS Staat. Munich (Karl Alber), 1946, I-XXTIT, 1-339.
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It is bad policy to slaughter, as is happening now, some tens of thou-
sands of Jews and Poles. This does neither kill the idea of the Polish
state in the eyes of the masses nor does it dispose of the Jews; on the
contrary, as this slaughter is being done it does the greatest harm, com-
plicates the problems and makes them much more dangerous than they
would have been if we had acted in a considered and practical way.
These are the effects of the present policy:
a) Enemy propaganda is furnished with the most effective material
that could possibly be thought of. What foreign radio stations have
reported so far was only a tiny fraction of what actually happened.
We must be prepared for an increase of foreign propaganda which will
do extreme political damage since those disgusting atrocities actually
happened and cannot be denied by any means.
d) The greatestharm, however, which will be suffered by the German
people itself owing to present conditions, is the extreme brutalization
and moral degeneracy which will spread among valuable German human
material like pestilence in a very short time.
There is only one chance to stop this plague: to subject those criminals
and their following instantly to military command and military juris-
diction.
The report then quoted a statement by General Ulex, com-
mander of Grenzabschnitt Sued, addressed to the supreme com-
mander of the army in the East and dated 6 February 1940.
General Ulex also condemned the atrocities committed by police
forces passionately and in addition believed that the superiors
of those who committed the crimes tacitly approved their mis-
deeds and just did not want to interfere. He added that the
atrocities which came to his knowledge were most likely only a
small fraction of the total number of atrocities actually commit-
ted. He recommended that all police forces including their higher
leaders and all commanders attached to the organizations of the
Government General be dismissed quite abruptly, that all those
units be inactivated and "replaced with morally intact and
honorable units." Finally the report quoted a statement on the
same subject by Maj6r von Tschammer und Osten, liaison officer
at the Government General. This statement emphasized that in
addition to atrocities against the population the SS and police
also committed acts of robbery and looting whenever they car-
ried out searches. Officially seized goods of all sorts were dis-
tributed among the police and SS forces or sold at a nominal
price. At a conference at the Government General, held on. 23
January 1940, Major General Buehrmann, commissioner for the
four-year plan, reported that IRittmeister Schuh, the exception-
ally efficient chief of one of the four-year-plan offices, managed
to have the SS give up- large quantities of watches and gold.
With regard to such conditions, von Tschammer und Osten went
on, one could not be surprised to see that everybody made use
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of every chance to get rich. It could be done without any danger,
for when stealing is committed by the whole organization the
individual thief has no reason to be afraid of punishment. The
Polish population who were defenseless in the face of these
crimes and were driven to despair by such acts would, of course,
fanatically support every movement aiming at revolt and re-
venge. "It is only natural that their feelings are increased to
boundless hatred when they see, every time a transport arrives,
the many corpses of childen who died of hung& and the trucks
full of human beings frozen to death."
The main report contained an enclosure listing and describing
33 specific instances of the most revolting acts of atrocity com-
mitted by SS and police personnel. In most of these cases the
names of the SS and police personnel who committed these
crimes and the number and denomination of their units were
given.
On 1 November 1941, Wilhelm Kube, General Commissioner
for iWhite IRuthenia, sent a letter of complaint to Heinrich
Lohse, Reich Commissioner for the eastern territories, in which
he complained "about the manner in which the Judenaktion
(the extermination of the Jews) in Sluzk was handled. He de-
clared the officers of the Police Battalion No. 11 from Kauen to
be responsible for the "insufficient and uncoordinated execution
of this action, where the injured were buried together with the
dead, only to work their way out of the graves again." He de-
clared this to be highly detrimental to the reputation of the
German administration and demanded that the responsible offi-
cers be prosecuted (Doe. No. NO-2456).
The most condemning document is a group of six reports (Doe.
No. NO-3028) with a letter of transmittal dated 10 July 1943
from Dr. Braeutigam, the Reichs Minister of Occupied Eastern
Territories, to SS Obergruppenfuetrer Berger, the Chief of the
SS Hauptampt which was responsible for the recruitment of SS
personnel. These reports included a report dated 2 July 1943 by
Propaganda Leader Lauch, obviously a representative of the
Propaganda Ministry who was sent to the East to spread Na-
tional Socialist propaganda among the population; reports by
the Reichs Commissioner Wilhelm Kube of 3 June 1943, by the
General Commissioner of Minsk and others. Lauch's report
gives a day by day description of antipartisan activities near
Minsk, which started on 16 May 1943. Characteristic is his
entry for the 24th of May 1943, describing what he found at
Nebyschino:
There were two barns filled with the corpses of partisans or those sus-
pected of being partisans who had been shot, and though fire had been
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set to the barns, the corpses had not been burned completely. In one
of the barns four pigs were feeding from six charred bodies . .. The
whole picture was one of senseless devastation and made a very bad
impression on the remaining population...
Lauch stated in his report that on the 27th of May 1943 he
discontinued his propaganda campaign. He obviously compiled
his report as an explanation of why he did so. He concluded that
he considered propaganda ineffective in the face of an obvious
policy of burning villages down and shooting the people. Lauch's
report was forwarded to Braeutigam by Wilhelm Kube, to whom
it had been sent by the General Commissioner of Minsk who
included also his own observations and other adverse reports
concerning the large antipartisan operations of the SS and police
under the leadership of Von dem Bach and Von Gottberg.
An event very similar to that observed by Lauch was also
described by Langer, a member of the staff of the General Com-
missioner of Minsk. Langer tells of incidents which occurred in
Witonitsch near Borrisow, which is in the vicinity of Minsk. He
states: "Inhabitants were driven into a barn, shot down and the
buildings set afire. Since the corpses did not burn completely,
the pigs are carrying parts of the charred bodies into the vil-
lages where they lie about."
In his forwarding letter to Kube the General Commissioner
of Minsk closes by saying, "Particularly the Regiment Dirle-
wanger excels in actions of that sort. It consists almost entirely
of convicts from Germany."
Another report by Langer, from the Office of the General Com-
missioner of Minsk, contains the following information:
On the 27th of May at 1400 hours, the inhabitants of Krjwsk were
herded into two houses by the SS and Ukrainians and fire was set to the
houses so that they burned to death. The same happened in another
village, Kraschynn.
Berger's reaction, in his one-page letter addressed to Braeu-
tigam of the East Ministry, is very revealing. He stated that he
regretted deeply that such reports were sent on without further
investigation and thus caused a great stir and above all hampered
close cooperation. In Berger's opinion, Generalkommissar Kube
should have investigated these cases immediately and then con-
tacted Von Gottberg and Von dem Bach. Berger closed:
We cannot change anything from where we are anyhow, for it is not
possible to give orders to troops without thorough knowledge of the
situation. Moreover, Herr Kube's attention might be directed to the
fact that these criminals are primarily former Party members, pre-
viously convicted for poaching or some other slight offense. They are
now given an opportunity to prove themselves and do so in spite of
bloody losses and with great ardor.
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In other words, this assignment was a means of blood cement
by which offenders and recalcitrants could gain readmission into
the good graces of the SS.
A revealing additional sidelight was provided by Walther
Eppehauer, Berger's adjutant, who stated in an interrogation
(Summary No. 314 of 17 October 1946) that SS officers whom
Berger disliked were usually transferred to the Dirlewanger
Brigade. This was obviously a move to make them acquire blood
cement and thus to become acceptable to him as firmly welded
to the organization.
Of the "behind the scenes" men we have not caught all be-
cause some were not known as SS members. Accessories to SS
crimes were to be found everywhere in Germany and especially
in the vicinity of the concentration camps. The merchants who
profited from deliveries of merchandise to concentration camps
and who saw to it that the major portion of the delivered mate-
rial reached the SS administrators in the form of graft were
accomplices. And the civilian employes who calmly worked in
the sight of abject misery on the concentration camp grounds-
they also were accomplices. We have not caught them all, and
we have not made a point of catching them all and especially in
the recent trial we limited ourselves to the "inner circle" alone
because they were beyond doubt the moving powers in this nasty
business and were the main triggermen of the gang.
The master crime to which the SS was committed was the
genocide of non-German peoples and the elimination by killing,
in groups or singly, of Germans who were considered useless
or disloyal. In effecting the two parts of this program Himmler
demanded and received the cooperation of physicians and of
German medical science. For this trend of research in Nazi
Germany-namely, that toward developing scientific methods of
destroying and preventing life-I have proposed the term
"ktenology," the science of killing.
In the course of this ktenological research, methods of mass
killing and mass sterilization were investigated and developed
as well as methods for rapid and inconspicuous individual exe-
cution. Among the studies on mass sterilization some rather
fantastic methods were proposed; for instance, Brack suggested
non-conspicuous x-ray sterilization of conquered populations by
building high-powered x-ray machinery into desks at which in-
habitants of conquered nations would have to sit for five or ten
minutes while filling out questionnaires. In this process they
would all be sterilized. Research carried out on young male pris-
oners at Auschwitz concentration camp by Dr. Horst Schumann
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showed that this method was far from inconspicuous because of
the intense burns and tissue necrosis produced in the genital
regions. At the same camp, with equally callous use of young
female prisoners, sterilizing intrauterine injections were devel-
oped by Dr. Clauberg, with the assistance of Dr. Goebel, a
pharmacologist, with the intention of having them administered
during the course of a regular health inspection in conquered
territories.
A committee of physicians and medical experts headed by
Dr. Karl Brandt developed various methods of extermination
by gas. At first carbon monoxide was used, later cyanide gas
("cyclon B") with occasional use of warfare gases for which
this program supplied human experimental material. Of the
individual methods of inconspicuous execution, which were
usually carried out in camp hospitals by medical personnel,
the most widely used method was the intravenous injection of
phenol or gasoline. This, however, left a tell-tale odor with
the corpse which made it an undesirable means of executing
prominent prisoners or high-ranking Nazi Party personnel
where secrecy was essential.
The triumph of that part of ktenological research aimed at
finding a method of inconspicuous execution which would pro-
duce autopsy findings indicative of death from natural causes
was the development of intravenous injections of a suspension
of live tubercle bacilli which brought on acute miliary tuber-
culosis within a few weeks. This method was produced by
Dr. Heissmeyer, who was one of Dr. Gebhardt's associates at
the SS hospital of Hohenlychen.
As a means of further camouflage so that the SS at large
would not suspect the purpose of these experiments, the pre-
liminary tests for the efficacy of this method were performed
exclusively on children imprisoned in the Natzweiler concen-
tration camp.
This perversion of the role of the physician in Nazi Germany
extended beyond the SS. Dr. James C. White told me that on
German submarines it was the physician's duty to execute
trouble makers among the crew by lethal injections. The pat-
tern of this activity, however, was set by the SS and flourished
in no other organization of the Third Reich as generally and in
as high echelons as in the SS.
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